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INTRODUCTION 
 
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States had a tremendous influence on 
international politics. Looking at the debate about the respective medium and long-term effects 
raises a multitude of questions. From a European perspective the question is to which extent the 
European Union’s foreign and security policy is affected. On the one hand one can argue that an 
impulse has been created to strengthen the EU’s role as an international actor. On the other hand 
the opinion prevails that the Union plays a rather marginal role. Immediately after  
September 11, European solidarity was repeatedly expressed and almost no doubts remained 
that the EU as well as the member states would staunchly cooperate with the US government in 
the fight against terrorism. The EU’s reaction to the terrorist threat became manifested in 
different ways and resulted in specific measures. In addition to the broad agreement to support 
the coalition against terrorism and the corresponding statements, a Plan of Action was adopted 
by a special European Council on 21 September 2001, comprising diplomatic efforts, police and 
judicial cooperation, humanitarian aid, air transport security, economic and financial measures 
and emergency preparedness. 
 
However, the EU is not considered as a foreign policy heavy weight, and the United 
States demonstrated quite clearly that it is they that control and execute the fight against 
terrorism. Moreover, for the time being there seems to be no real need for the US to demand 
substantial European military support and the EU has no influence on the development of 
American foreign policy and Washington’s choice of a unilateral approach. In early 2002, when 
US President George Bush expressed America’s determination to extend the fight against 
terrorism on other countries (“axis of evil”), European criticism of American foreign policy 
became louder, but with only marginal effects. 
 
As the world’s largest exporter and second largest importer, the EU can be defined as a 
leading international economic power. For a long period of time, and especially in comparison 
to the United States, it was mainly the trade dimension that was considered in describing the 
Union’s international relevance. Other external activities, like for example the cooperation and 
development policy, received less attention. With the development of a Common Foreign and 
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Security Policy (CFSP), the EU slowly began to sharpen its profile as a foreign policy actor. 
Adding the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to the CFSP has made European 
foreign policy a comprehensive process. But again and again, for many reasons, European 
foreign policy remained a target for criticism. Against such a background, this working paper 
analyses the specificity of EU foreign policy post September 11, asking whether the EU is a 
negligible actor or one that matters. Two questions are of particular concern: 
§ Are there any significant effects after September 11 on the EU’s external relations 
towards third countries and regions? 
§ What are the consequences for the post-Nice debate and the further development of the 
foreign and security policy of an enlarging EU? 
 
The first part of the paper deals with the external dimension, by looking at the European 
policy towards selected third states and regions. The Middle East and North Africa are regions 
with which long-lasting forms of European cooperation and engagement can be found which are 
distinctively different in comparison to US foreign policy. The Balkans have become an area of 
tremendous EU involvement and a test case for European crisis prevention and crisis 
management capabilities. Relations with Russia are already a major aspect on the EU’s foreign 
policy agenda, and will become even more important with respect to the enlargement of the EU. 
Shaping policies towards these regions cannot be done by neglecting the transatlantic dimension. 
Thus, the EU’s external relations are to a large extent influenced by the quality and needs of the 
transatlantic link. 
 
Analysing EU foreign policy furthermore implies respecting the internal dynamics of the 
EU and the mechanisms that influence the decision-making process. Consequently, the second 
part of this paper explains the importance of reforming the EU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy in a comprehensive way. But the consequences of September 11 cannot be reduced to the 
foreign and security political implications. Not least since the EU is on the verge of enlargement 
it is necessary to consider new actors and interests. And finally, there is even a lasting effect on 
the further development of the European integration process. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
External dimension 
 
The Middle East and North Africa 
The September 11 attacks have demonstrated the necessity of the long-term approach towards 
the Middle East and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process there will be either a long-term management of the conflict by settlement, or break 
up altogether, with serious implications for regional security. After several months of benign 
neglect September 11 did convince the Bush administration that it ought to play a more active 
role in the conflict although it reduced at the same time its tolerance for what was perceived as 
Palestinian terrorism. However, the new envoy Anthony Zinni proved unable to bring the 
bloody war of attrition between Israelis and Palestinians to an end. Even worse, the cycle of 
violence and counter-violence ultimately culminated in a large campaign of the Israeli army that 
led, at least temporarily, to the re-occupation of most autonomous Palestinian areas in the West 
Bank. 
 
Instead of embarking on a risky strategy of military intervention in Iraq, the EU should 
move towards a swift implementation of and further evolution towards a regime where 
restrictions on – and delays to – Iraqi non-lethal imports are lifted. At the same time military 
controls must be kept in place, and some form of weapons of mass destruction monitoring needs 
to be re-established. Such a policy would also have a good chance of restoring some cohesion in 
the alliance, and of avoiding problems with, and within, friendly states in the region. The EU 
and the United States should agree on a common agenda for a “post-Saddam” era in Iraq, 
regardless of when it comes about. It would be a good idea to outline the conditions under 
which an Iraqi government could be reintegrated into the international community and receive 
the support required for the reconstruction of its infrastructure. 
 
 Concerning the Southern Mediterranean countries the EU should embark on a pragmatic 
dialogue on terrorism with its partner countries while adopting a higher profile on issues of 
democracy and human rights. To the countries having signed association agreements the EU 
should offer to enter into a comprehensive policy dialogue aimed at creating a “Mediterranean 
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tiger” – as a role model of successful development. These “association partnerships” will 
eventually lead to a type of relationship somewhere between a mere association and a full-
fledged EU membership.  
 
The Balkans 
At first glimpse one could be tempted to ask whether the recent successes of the European 
Balkan strategy combining crisis management and military presence with reconstruction and 
reform assistance might serve as a model for a post-Taliban Afghanistan. A ”Balkan model” or a 
”stability pact for Afghanistan,” however, might be a fallacy. The promise of a (long-term) 
perspective of EU accession gives the states and nations of the Balkans a common objective they 
never had before. It also gives Brussels the leverage needed to push and guide unpopular 
reform processes and to stimulate economic development and political democratisation in the 
framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process.  
 
Despite the virulence of the ethnic and territorial conflicts in the Balkans, state 
sovereignty is and remains the highest goal. Conversely, for at least the past twenty years 
Afghanistan has not seen any ruler seriously concerned with any sovereignty based on more 
than military force and control over strategic locations. The key premises of European 
stabilisation policies for the Balkans are missing in the case of Afghanistan. Whereas the Balkan 
model may not be transferable, the key lesson learnt in that region over the past ten years, 
however, may remain valid. Without an equally substantial and determined program of 
humanitarian aid, economic reconstruction and political stabilisation, no military intervention – 
no matter how massive – can produce long-term stability and security. The political will and 
stamina of the international community to stimulate and guide processes of stabilisation and 
sustainable development for years and decades on end will be decisive.  
 
During the war in Afghanistan, the USA and its European allies agreed on a combination 
of military power and humanitarian aid. In the implementation of the Bonn Agreement, the 
diverging American and European philosophies of stabilisation and modernisation as well as 
the balancing of hard and soft power projection are bound to reappear. In the aftermath of the 
bombing, the US aversion against peace-keeping missions and comprehensive post-conflict 
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strategies already reappeared. These policy preferences are reminiscent of Balkan exit strategies 
and a division of labour between US warfare and European post-war reconstruction.  
 
Russia 
The crucial question remains to what extent the consequences of September 11 will go further 
toward impulses to strengthen integration and co-operation between East and West than single-
issue short-term action. The current situation can be best described as a window of opportunity: 
If Russia continues its policy of becoming a modern European country, the EU will be facing the 
challenge of its growing importance. Future developments depend on Russia’s strategic choice of 
further modernisation and the EU’s capacity and capability to be a security and defence actor in 
the international arena.  
 
The European Union and its member states fulfil several conditions for a modernisation 
partnership. The EU is customer number one for Russian exports, and with about 40 percent 
amount of foreign direct investment, the EU member states are the biggest direct investors in 
Russia. The Union is also the largest provider of technical assistance to Russia. Furthermore, 
supporting the Central and East European candidates states through the combination of 
impending membership and rule-setting for internal development from the outside is a unique 
success story for stabilising transition processes. If Russia is setting new goals for its transition, 
the Union should use these experiences to stabilise internal Russian developments. Potentially, 
the EU policies of the technical assistance program TACIS and the humanitarian aid office 
ECHO can be adopted to the additional requirements. A clear concept of designing a common 
European economic area is still missing, but nevertheless extending security related co-
operation towards a widespread partnership might be a fresh impulse. Taking into 
consideration requirements of Russian modernisation, the economic relationship should go 
beyond energy exports  from Russia to Europe.  
 
United States – The transatlantic dimension 
The deep impact the events of September 11 have left on the United States and on the American 
view of the world is shaping transatlantic relations. Those partners and institutions that are of 
relevance or of support in the current challenges will be at the center of US perception of this 
relationship. Those who remain indifferent or become cause for concern will move to the 
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margins of the relationship – to say the least. A new transatlantic agenda addressing the issues 
of the 21st Century is needed with long-term commitments from both sides of the Atlantic and a 
strong political will to implement this agenda. When acting together, the US and Europe need 
deeper relations than exist today. Windows of opportunity could be found in many issues:  as 
the following list may show: Greater transparency, closer cooperation, and the sharing of 
intelligence ; a conclusive security strategy; adequate burden sharing focusing on output-goals; 
effective means of cooperation between ESDP and NATO; ongoing common support for the 
stabilization of South Central Europe; re-engagement in the Middle East Peace Process; a 
common strategic approach to the second round of NATO enlargement.  
 
Europe requires the attention and the normative power of American foreign policy. 
America needs the resources of the European economic power in order to flank its peace and 
security order – not just in the Middle East and in Africa but also in trouble spots in Asia and 
Latin America. To this end, Europe must be more strongly involved in negotiations on political 
settlements. Developing solutions to global challenges – be it the environment, migration or 
social and ethnic conflicts – is not about preserving the power of security policy. Anyone who 
wants to make a real contribution requires partners and coalitions. Together, Europe and the 
United States represent the ideal critical mass. Should the transatlantic partnership weaken, 
rivals of the West could play America and Europe off against one another, manipulating global 
competition between economic blocs. At a time when East Asia is unfolding its economic and 
demographic potential, such transatlantic rivalry would be damaging to both partners.  
 
 
 
Internal dimension  
 
Comprehensive security  
The EU has realised that security policy will have to follow a comprehensive concept – 
September 11 has underlined that. A look at the non-military capabilities of EU external 
relations offers a broad range of instruments and policies available. However, what is still 
lacking is a strategic vision of the EU’s foreign policy. Article 11 of the Treaty on European 
Union defines the objectives of CFSP without reflecting a clear geopolitical thinking. The 
geographic extension of CFSP/ESDP needs to be clarified, which means to define whether the 
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significance of this policy will be mainly concentrated on the enlarged EU’s closer 
neighbourhood or whether it is a policy with a global outreach.  
 
CFSP/ESDP cannot be sufficiently developed without finding a satisfactory solution for 
how to improve the decision-making process. By offering a flexible instrument for 
accommodating the interests of pro-integrationist member states, enhanced co-operation can 
diminish the negative effects of possible blockages of classical decision-making procedures in an 
enlarged EU. Furthermore, effective decision-making and common external action may be 
increasingly difficult to achieve without moves towards at least the partial communitarization of 
CFSP. 
 
Attempts to further communitarize CFSP must exclude the sensitive field of military 
affairs, to which the current and future member states attribute the high value of national 
sovereignty. Military crisis management as one branch of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy 
must not be linked with the term ‘communitarization’. Instead, matters of joint concern in the 
military sphere of ESDP should – for the time being – continue to be handled by means of 
intergovernmentalism. On the other hand, the traditional civilian aspects of the EU’s foreign 
policy, including non-military crisis management should be brought closer to the Community 
method as the resources necessary to implement them are to be found mainly in the area of 
today’s Community competences. Institutional developments alone will not suffice to enhance 
the EU’s role as a holistic international security actor. The Union will need to further develop its 
operational assets and capabilities. It is in this respect that the current and future member states 
of the EU will have to further intensify their efforts, streamline their overall military structures 
and increase both their national defence budgets and developmental aid spending if they want 
to live up to their own expectations. 
 
 Security in a comprehensive understanding implies, furthermore, that CFSP/ESDP 
cannot be limited to one pillar of the European treaty framework. On the contrary, there is a 
necessity for an overarching approach – which was further underlined following September 11 
when Justice and Home Affairs became a central topic in the security debate. To close the gap 
between “common” and “intergovernmental” would thus imply the harmonisation of 
conflicting policy fields for a common interest. This will also touch those policy fields still 
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located in the third pillar. Similar to the case of CFSP, the distinct pillar containing the 
remaining aspects of cooperation of police and justice will in the end have to be abolished 
subsequently. However, if the EU is about to tackle the trans-border consequences of the 
freedom of movement in the common market, a full legislative participation of the European 
Parliament and a democratic scrutiny of executive actions should be guaranteed. The fight 
against terrorism must not weaken our basic values and rights. Thus, the democratic and 
understandable realization of an area of freedom, security and justice will be one task for the 
convention and the 2004 intergovernmental conference. 
 
Enlargement 
The necessity to adequately react to the challenges of international terrorism should not hamper 
developments of major European projects such as enlargement. On the contrary, the process 
should rather gain momentum than come to a halt. September 11 and its aftermath did not 
negatively affect the enlargement process. One cannot yet assess the impact of the fight against 
international terrorism on subsequent second or third rounds of enlargement. However, as the 
details of a next round of EU widening will become evident at the end of 2002 or early 2003, 
there will be a need to agree on a coherent and binding enlargement strategy.  
 
The adoption of a quickly developing acquis on internal security constitutes a major 
challenge for the candidates' already stretched police and judicial systems. The accession 
countries will have to strengthen their border-control efforts, share intelligence and information 
and increase their state capacity to track the movement of persons. The EU will have to help in 
developing institutional capacities and prove practical assistance, both human and financial. The 
fight against international terrorism requires to improve coherence and co-ordination between 
the EU's external and internal security concerns. To achieve this, the Union should take into 
account the neighbourhood aspects of existing border regimes, visa and immigration policies 
when designing, implementing and revising common strategies on its direct neighbourhood in 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Proposals on legislation in the area of Justice and Home 
Affairs should contain a “neighbourhood impact assessment” that considers the specific 
exposure of the accession countries and/or future new member states. 
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In an attempt to strengthen border controls on the enlarged EU's new eastern borders, 
thought should be given to the idea to establish a European Border Guard, consisting of border 
guards from all member states who are specially trained to serve in joint missions. Such a 
European Border Guard needs to be based on the principles of equal partnership and reciprocity 
among new and old member states. With the fusion of the Single Market and the Schengen zone, 
there is a rationale to create a European Customs Service composed of customs officers from all 
member states. Through a joint institution, member states could share the financial burdens (and 
revenues), exercise a joint control and thus develop mutual confidence. 
 
European integration beyond September 11 
The reform of the European Union is linked to long-term projects. The effect of September 11 in 
the areas in question can only be to exert additional pressure to take action and to provide just 
one more argument for the necessity of efficient and democratically legitimated decision-making 
procedures.  After decades of focusing on economic objectives, the EU, today, is more and more 
measured by its performance in basic duties of the state such as the guarantee of interior and 
exterior security, the realization of personal freedom, general prosperity and appropriate social 
conditions. The fact that these challenges had already been tackled before September 11 
illustrates the magnitude of the ambitious integration projects initiated by the member states 
and the common institutions over the past few years. What September 11 meant for the reform 
of the political system of the EU can be described as an additional impetus for integration. 
 
 
 
 13
EXTERNAL DIMENSION 
 
 
The Middle East and North Africa 
 
September 11 and the American war on terrorism is bound to affect the Middle East and North 
African region deeply. As in the case of the Gulf crisis in 1990-91 and the subsequent war to 
liberate Kuwait, the international response to the attacks has the potential to trigger off a broad 
regional realignment. Some of the problems that were placed at the top of the international 
agenda in the wake of September 11 were familiar ones. However, the extent of the damage has 
decisively changed the way in which they are perceived and added a new sense of urgency. All 
of the countries in the region, with the exception of Iraq, condemned the attacks immediately. 
Yet, in contrast to the Gulf crisis, Arab governments were quick to point out that they were not 
prepared to play a military role in the emerging campaign against the terrorists and their hosts. 
Some linked the attacks to American foreign policy in the region, and emphasized that the war 
on terrorism should be confined to Afghanistan. Targeting any other country would lead to 
serious regional destabilisation. 
 
Renewal of US engagement in the region 
The Bush administration has come to the conclusion that the cost of consistent engagement in 
the region is lower than the cost of non-engagement. The direction and pressure of US policy 
will lead to significantly greater political costs, and this increases the importance of cost-benefit 
analysis for the region’s governments, and the potential dangers. For the European Union, the 
redefinition of US foreign policy harbours the possibility of fostering new kinds of transatlantic 
co-operation in certain fields where interests converge and coincide. 
 
Beyond Afghanistan, there are Somalia, Sudan and perhaps even Yemen as possible 
targets in a next phase of the American campaign, though perhaps only in terms of diplomatic 
pressure, for they are known to tolerate terrorist organisations on their soil. Their public 
institutions are fragile, have been weakened by civil war, and are both unable and unwilling to 
prevent terrorists from exploiting the power vacuum to operate training camps and maintain 
safe refuges. 
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Israeli-Palestinian peace process 
The September 11 attacks have demonstrated the necessity of the long-term approach towards 
the Middle East and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process there will be either a long-term management of the conflict by settlement, or break 
up altogether, with serious implications for regional security. After several months of benign 
neglect September 11 did convince the Bush administration that it ought to play a more active 
role in the conflict although it reduced at the same time its tolerance for what was perceived as 
Palestinian terrorism. However, the new envoy Anthony Zinni proved unable to bring the 
bloody war of attrition between Israelis and Palestinians to an end. Even worse, the cycle of 
violence and counter-violence ultimately culminated in a large campaign of the Israeli army that 
led, at least temporarily, to the re-occupation of most autonomous Palestinian areas in the West 
Bank. 
 
The negative effects of the smouldering conflict on the region and the international 
community as a whole are becoming increasingly clear. The visible plight of the Palestinians 
continues on an almost daily basis to fuel Arab anger at the attitude of the West, and serves as a 
welcome pretext for religious zealots. Yet, the collapse of the Camp David summit demonstrated 
that the US is unable to finalize a comprehensive agreement. What is needed is a strong, 
coordinated involvement of the main external actors, the US and the EU, in co-operation with 
other players such as Russia, Egypt, Jordan and the UN. This could take the form of a U.S.-EU 
working group on the Middle East, with representation at Secretary of State/Foreign Minister 
level. It would force EU countries to intensify co-ordination of their positions on the solution of 
the conflict, ultimately including those relating to final status issues. The implementation of the 
Mitchell proposals constitutes an important initial basis, but this can only be the first step. As 
stated in the Mitchell report, confidence-building measures cannot be sustained without a return 
to serious negotiations. An enduring cease-fire is only likely to be enforced if it is combined with 
the perspective of substantial progress in this field. One possibility would be to construct a 
piecemeal agreement by solving certain key questions, while relegating others to a later date. 
Another option might be the gradual implementation of a comprehensive agreement, including 
some “package deals” of the kind familiar from the European negotiating experience. The 
renewed negotiations should be based on proposals and ideas mooted between the time of Camp 
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David (July 2000) and Taba (January 2001), including the Clinton proposals (December 2000). The 
EU should be ready to take part in a monitoring force after a significant cooling-off period. With a 
clear mandate, and the cooperation of the parties with regard to its implementation, a peace-
keeping force would have a positive effect.  
 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
The September 11 attacks have demonstrated the necessity of a long-term approach in the region 
to complement military action against the terrorist networks and their supporters. The terrorist 
attacks were perpetrated by Islamist terrorists of Arab background reflecting in many ways the 
profound crisis of the MENA region that expresses itself in a widespread use of religious and 
cultural identity as a mobilising resource. The cultural and religious revival in the MENA region 
is the manifestation of a deeper structural crisis. It reflects the failure of institutional 
arrangements and social structures in the face of a dynamic and evolving environment. The 
scenario of rapid social change and economic decline coupled with authoritarian institutions 
which are unable to cope with the challenge constitutes the breeding-ground of political Islam. 
The political mobilisation of religious values is not confined to Islam in general, or the Middle 
East in particular. Rather, it is a phenomenon that is just as global as modernisation or 
globalisation. 
 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership established in 1995 is Europe’s institutional 
framework for fostering change throughout much of the region. Six years after initiating the 
process, it has still not come up with a success story, nor has it triggered off a broad 
transformation process in the southern Mediterranean partner countries. The lack of visible 
success is mainly due to the rather lukewarm manner in which the partners on both shores of 
the Mediterranean have embraced it. This is bound to change after September 11, for it is 
becoming increasingly clear that the external aspects of the socio-economic crisis in the southern 
Mediterranean pose a strategic rather than a tactical challenge to Europe. The EU should not 
devote its time to the futile search for an internationally accepted definition of terrorism, 
especially in the Mediterranean context, where in the public discourse the lines between 
terrorists, resistance fighters and opposition groups are blurred. Rather, the EU should embark 
on a pragmatic dialogue with Southern Mediterranean countries on an ad hoc basis to identify 
common concerns and co-ordinate policies in this field. The EU should ensure that the fight 
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against terrorism is not exploited by southern partner countries and used as a pretext for an 
indiscriminate attack on non-violent opposition groups, most of whom espouse some kind of 
Islamism. It must be remembered that the fight against terrorism involves the speedy arrest of 
suspects, and that this conflicts with the ongoing insistence on the rule of law and the 
independence of the judiciary systems in the Southern Mediterranean countries. Although many 
Western politicians have been at pains to stress that the war against terrorism is not a war 
against Islam in general, many in the region seem to think that it is. Such mutual demonisation 
must be resisted if the spirit of partnership invoked by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is to 
be maintained. Thus it is of the utmost importance to start a frank cultural dialogue with the 
Southern Mediterranean countries to discuss mutual concerns and define shared values on 
different levels. Moderate Islamists should be included in this dialogue since they are the 
popular movement with the broadest mass base in most southern partner countries. 
 
If the EU is serious about transforming the Mediterranean basin into a region of stability 
and prosperity, it will have to become far more involved in the transformation processes of the 
various countries. The EU should try to stimulate the socio-economic transformation of those 
countries which have already made some progress, thereby creating a “Mediterranean tiger” as 
a role model of successful development which others can copy. The EU should offer to enter into 
a comprehensive policy dialogue with Southern Mediterranean countries which have signed 
association agreements, thereby creating an ”association partnership” that will eventually lead 
to a type of relationship that is much more than a mere association, though less than fully-
fledged membership of the Union. The aim of such a partnership should be to reach agreement 
on a long-term reform programme which the EU would support with a substantial package of 
financial assistance. 
 
The Gulf region 
In the aftermath of September 11, Saudi-Arabia has come under intense criticism in the 
American public debate for the rather lukewarm support it has offered in the war against 
terrorism. Many observers are now having second thoughts about a friendly country which 
cloaks political interests in religious discourse, and finances innumerable charities with ties to 
fundamentalist networks. Saudi officials are afraid that there will be a strong domestic backlash 
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if the monarchy is identified too closely with US military action in the region. Even worse, most 
of the terrorists involved in the highjacking are believed to be Saudi nationals.  
Given the paramount spiritual importance of Saudi-Arabia for hundreds of  millions of 
Muslims all over the world, not to speak of its key role in global energy supply, there is an 
urgent need for Europe to reinforce its presence. The EU should rapidly improve its ties beyond 
the envisaged free-trade agreement aimed at supporting the political and economic 
development of the monarchy and its smaller partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council. The 
unfolding American campaign against terrorism and the swift way in which it succeeded in 
toppling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan has strengthened those voices in the administration 
which are in favour of opening a second front against Iraq.  
 
Since evidence linking Iraq to the al-Qa'ida network is rather circumstantial, there has 
been a marked tendency in the administration to emphasize the danger of Iraq supplying 
weapons of mass destruction to future terrorist groups. If Iraq were to be attacked, the US 
would have to act without a sizeable international coalition, for the EU, including the United 
Kingdom, and America's allies in the region have expressed their strong opposition to such a 
move. Furthermore, any serious military action against Iraq would damage the new partnership 
with Russia which evolved after September 11, for Moscow maintains close economic and 
political ties with the Baghdad regime. 
 
Instead of embarking on a risky strategy of military intervention in Iraq, the EU should 
move towards a swift implementation of and further evolution towards a regime where 
restrictions on – and delays to – Iraqi non-lethal imports are lifted. At the same time military 
controls must be kept in place, and some form of weapons of mass destruction monitoring needs 
to be re-established. Such a policy would also have a good chance of restoring some cohesion in 
the alliance, and of avoiding problems with, and within, friendly states in the region. Whilst 
Europeans and Americans agree that a change of regime in Iraq is desirable, how this should be 
achieved is a moot point. However, the EU and the United States should agree on a common 
agenda for a “post-Saddam” era in Iraq, regardless of when it comes about. It would be a good 
idea to outline the conditions under which an Iraqi government could be reintegrated into the 
international community and receive the support required for the reconstruction of its 
infrastructure. 
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The Balkans 
 
Did September 11 change the strategies for the Balkan imbroglio? Several prominent pieces of 
evidence link the terrorist attacks to the Balkans and European policies for the Balkans. Some of 
the linkages are part of a broader shift in international politics (which may or may not predate 
the terror attacks), others relate specifically to the Balkans and European policies for the region. 
These linkages reach from transatlantic relations with their implications for Balkan policies to 
the implications for the on-going process of EU Eastern and (eventually) Southeastern 
enlargement and from the politics and rhetoric in the region itself to lessons learnt in the Balkans 
for the reconstruction and ”transformation” of Afghanistan. 
 
The transatlantic dimension of Balkan policies 
The ”War on Terror” has marked a geographic reorientation of US foreign policy. Although a 
tendency of ”benign neglect” characterised the Balkan policies of the new Bush administration 
even prior to September 11, it has since become common understanding that the Balkans are 
first and foremost a burden for Europe to carry in context of a new transatlantic division of 
labour. The nascent European capabilities for military conflict-prevention and diplomatic crisis-
management under CFSP and ESDP are thus in high demand. Already before September 11, the 
State Department had indicated that a follow-up mission in Macedonia ought to be a European 
endeavour, whereas the Pentagon proved unwilling to commit any additional forces to this 
peace-keeping operation. Currently, the only US soldier serving in Operation Amber Fox is a 
press officer, although American logistical and intelligence support is still crucial for the 
operation.  Typically, in a first reaction on the dramatic events in New York and Washington, 
EU commissioner Chris Patten proclaimed the ”hour of Europe”, foreseeing both a strong 
impulse for European integration in security and foreign policy as well as increased 
responsibilities within Europe and beyond.   Short of a major new conflagration in the region, a 
US re-engagement in the Balkans is not to be expected. Rather, the gradual exit strategy 
predating September 11 will be implemented at an enhanced pace.  
 
A wider Europe and (South)eastern enlargement of the EU 
The debate on Muslim states (and state-like entities) in Europe and their inclusion in a future 
enlarged European Union has acquired a new dimension. This debate concerns not only Turkey, 
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the thirteenth candidate for EU membership since the 1999 Helsinki European Council, but also 
the Western Balkans and their status of potential candidacy for EU membership. Thus, 
September 11 may have long-term consequences for the concept of Europe and its identity as 
either an open union or a Western bulwark. Apart from the question of the territorial limits of a 
European finalité, the threat of destabilisation also redefines the trade-off between speed and 
quality, between stability and conditionality in the parallel processes of EU and NATO 
enlargement. Prior to the Kosovo War, no analyst would have given Romania and Bulgaria a 
ghost of a chance to open negotiations on EU accession. Yet, the Helsinki European Council of 
December 1999 opened negotiations with six more countries and offered Turkey the formal 
status of EU candidate. Similarly, the War on Terror may have a distinct impact on the parallel 
processes of NATO and EU enlargement. Prior to September 11, Slovakia and Slovenia (maybe 
Lithuania) was the best guess for the next round of NATO enlargement to be decided in Prague 
in late 2002. So far many consider a 19+7 scenario (including Romania and Bulgaria) a 
neglectable conclusion. Conversely, the European Union is preparing the ground for a ”big 
bang” scenario, including all ten East European accession states except Romania and Bulgaria. 
This scenario would reinstate the classical ”Balkans” (in contrast to the ”Western Balkans” as a 
1998 neologism in EU-speak) as a European region of potential and real instability, even though 
Romania and Bulgaria would still be EU candidates after a 2004 round of enlargement, whereas 
the five other countries would have to be content with ”a EU perspective.” 
 
At the same time, the international community and its regional partners have been 
alerted to the risks of terrorism in the Balkans and will increase their efforts to combat both the 
actual terrorists and the structural root causes (weak states, corruption and organised crime). 
Such shifting policy priorities will become noticeable in international frameworks and strategies 
for the region. Thus, Justice and Home Affairs would be a key policy area in a possible strategy 
of differentiated EU integration for Southeastern Europe. In the long run, an island of instability 
and a safe haven for terrorists within a continental pax europeana is not acceptable.  
 
Taliban connections in the Balkans 
Since Islamic terrorism has become a pivotal issue in the media worldwide, long reports and 
allegations concerning connections between Islamic ”regimes” in the Balkans and the Taliban or 
the al-Qa'ida network of Bin Laden began to appear in the local and the world press. Apart from 
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the Islam factor, fragile political structures, extensive possibilities for criminal activities and 
insufficient border controls constitute competitive advantages of the Balkans for terrorists 
looking for a foothold in Europe. Therefore, too much excitement over Bosnia as a ”Trojan 
horse” in Western security seems inappropriate, but with the current frenzy of security 
measures in the USA and Europe, the Western Balkans may gain additional importance for 
terrorist networks in Europe. Paradoxically, the most effective countermeasure may well be a 
consistent and intensive continuation of the current peace-building process. Yet, the 
international community and the neighbouring European Union in particular will face the 
challenge of having to improve security and surveillance in this unstable region too. In this 
context, the US action of arm-twisting of the Bosnian authorities to hand over several al-Qa'ida 
suspects in January to Guantanamo Bay without much concern for legal procedure or civil rights 
infuriated human-rights groups and is bound to preoccupy the European forces taking over 
police duties in Bosnia next year. 
 
Nevertheless, former foreign ”mercenaries” who decided to settle in Bosnia after the 
Dayton Agreement are more relevant for the region than highly educated ”sleepers” matching 
the FBI profile of the September 11 terrorists. For the time being, moreover, the media hype on 
real or alleged connections between local Muslim groups and Islamic fundamentalism seems 
more relevant than their actual numbers and intentions. True or false, these reports are used in 
regional and domestic politicking, but most of all to influence the international choice of policy 
options for the region by instrumentalizing the catchword ”terrorism.” The accusation of 
”terrorism” thus acquires a new urgency and quality within the region and most of all in its 
competition for international preference and allegiance. 
 
The argument by Belgrade and Skopje that they stand for law and order, constituting 
bulwarks of stability and state sovereignty may touch a nerve in Western capitals in the near 
future. All the more so as their opponents in Pristina or Tetovo can easily be portrayed as rebels, 
extremists and terrorists. Apart from a certain ambiguity in dealing with Muslim states in 
Europe, another obvious reflex might be a preference for stronger, well-functioning states in the 
region, adding to the already existing reluctance to see new, fragile states in a further downward 
spiral of regional fragmentation and destabilisation – a breeding ground for terrorism. 
Nevertheless, in view of the structural and long-term approach of the European Stabilisation 
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and Association Process for the region, crude attempts to influence presumed preferences for 
certain countries of nations are not likely to succeed. Local crises like Tetovo or Presevo may 
temporarily overrule the conditionality of the European ”pre-pre-accession” strategy, but 
neither Albanians nor Serbs can claim a special status as guarantors of regional stability or 
victims of regional conflicts. The crisis in the Presevo valley drove this point home for the 
Albanians, the crisis of the Macedonian state contained some clear signs for the neighbouring 
nations and states. 
 
Lessons learnt in the Balkans 
The first question, however, will be whether the recent successes of the European Balkan 
strategy combining crisis management and military presence with reconstruction and reform 
assistance might serve as a model for a post-Taliban Afghanistan. A ”Balkan model” or a 
”stability pact for Afghanistan,” however, might be a fallacy. Quite apart from the fragility of 
the stabilisation of the Balkans after the demise of the Milosevic regime (demonstrated by the 
unresolved Tetovo conflict, stopped just short of a civil war), the transferability of the Balkan 
strategy is highly doubtful. The promise of a (long-term) perspective of EU accession gives the 
states and nations of the Balkans a common objective they never had before. It also gives 
Brussels the leverage needed to push and guide unpopular reform processes and to stimulate 
economic development and political democratisation in the framework of the Stabilisation and 
Association Process. Nothing similar is remotely conceivable for Afghanistan: The non-
interference of its neighbours so far is largely based on military pressure and ad-hoc coalition-
building rather than a common objective or perspective of regional integration. 
 
Moreover, despite the virulence of the ethnic and territorial conflicts in the Balkans, state 
sovereignty is and remains the highest goal: Minorities may strive for maximum autonomy or 
even independence, but state and nation building will be at the core of their program too. It has 
become common practice to refer to the Balkans as a conglomerate of ”weak or failing states,” 
despite the fact that all governments have been elected democratically, have substantial 
sovereignty over the state’s territory and have been accepted as legitimate rulers by most of the 
populace. They only tend to fail in the conceptualisation and implementation of highly 
ambitious projects of modernisation and integration. Conversely, for at least the past twenty 
years Afghanistan has not seen any ruler seriously concerned with any sovereignty based on 
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more than military force and control over strategic locations. A civic concept of state and 
nationhood, integrating different ethnic and religious groups in a state legitimised by its 
functionality and output, seems utterly unthinkable in the Afghan imbroglio. Openness and the 
density of civic networks constitute both the strength and the vulnerability of highly developed 
Western societies, whereas pre-modern regimes with no sustainable policies of economic or 
infrastructure development or even democratic legitimisation derive their strength from modern 
military technology, their imperviousness from the possibility to withdraw to the mountains if 
necessary. Thus, the key premises of European stabilisation policies for the Balkans are missing 
in the case of Afghanistan. Whereas the Balkan model may not be transferable, the key lesson 
learnt in that region over the past ten years, however, may remain valid. Without an equally 
substantial and determined program of humanitarian aid, economic reconstruction and political 
stabilisation, no military intervention – no matter how massive – can produce long-term stability 
and security. The political will and stamina of the international community to stimulate and 
guide processes of stabilisation and sustainable development for years and decades on end will 
be decisive.  
 
Apart from the reorientation of US and European attention, possibly to the detriment of 
the Balkans in terms of human and financial resources, the aftermath of September 11 also 
constitutes a challenge for post-conflict stabilisation strategies in general. During the war in 
Afghanistan, the USA and its European allies agreed on a combination of military power and 
humanitarian aid. In the implementation of the Bonn Agreement, the diverging American and 
European philosophies of stabilisation and modernisation as well as the balancing of hard and 
soft power projection are bound to reappear. In the aftermath of the bombing, the US aversion 
against peace-keeping missions and comprehensive post-conflict strategies already reappeared.  
 
These policy preferences are reminiscent of Balkan exit strategies and a division of labour 
between US warfare and European post-war reconstruction. If the currently dominant trend 
towards short-lived strategic alliances and exit-strategies persists, European policies for the 
Balkans – so far based on a regional approach of intensive dialogue and perspectives of 
stabilisation and integration – may eventually be affected by proxy. 
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Russia 
 
Russia’s President Putin was the first foreign leader to express sympathy and solidarity with the 
United States following the attacks on New York and Washington. Using the hotline established 
between the two superpowers during the Cold War, Putin said “Russia is with America” and 
against the terrorists. Based on this position, Russia contributed several kinds of support for the 
Western military action in Afghanistan, and an air corridor for the flights of American aircraft 
was provided. Furthermore, Russia stands in for American interests in its Central Asian 
Alliances and supports the West with intelligence information. In addition to supporting the US, 
Russia also acts in its own direct interests, particularly in Central Asia and the Caucasus where 
it has to prevent potential terrorist threats.  
 
Apart from military and strategic action, Putin has been opening new windows of 
opportunity for relations between Russia and the West. Russia’s short-term signals surprised the 
international community, but in the half year that has followed, the long-term tasks have come 
increasingly into focus. Putin’s most significant foreign address on both short and long-term 
developments was his speech given in the German Bundestag on 25 September 2001 in Berlin. 
He started by highlighting the worldwide background to the tragedy of September 11 and 
continued with the need to build a new security architecture. In doing this, he suggested 
strengthening European integration but also thinking in a wider, i.e. pan-European security 
context. Russia’s clear support for the US and Putin’s declaration of the end of the Cold War 
surprised the Western world. At the same time most of the Russian political elite is critically 
astonished about Putin’s current position. One has to ask how far and by whom the President is 
supported, whether he is expressing his own power over other actors and influence groups, or 
whether he is under serious pressure from his opponents. Furthermore, the immediate co-
operation on strategic aspects, like providing the air corridor, is no guarantee of a strategic and 
sustainable partnership. Some doubts should be considered about the support for Putin among 
the Russian elite and public opinion.  
 
Russia’s new strategic approaches  
Taking lessons from history seriously, one has to consider that East and West have collaborated 
before under the pressure of common enemies and threats, but, for instance, after the end of 
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World War II co-operation turned very quickly into the new confrontation of the Cold War. 
Furthermore, at least some doubts should be considered about the support for Putin among the 
Russian elite. The strongest criticism is formulated by Communist and/or Nationalist 
representatives, who are comparing Putin with Yeltsin or Gorbachev. Beyond radical positions, 
even analysts and politicians who usually support Putin are much more sceptical now. Even if 
they do not criticise, they have started to brick up the new windows of opportunity with wish 
lists for compensation. The list starts with understanding Russia’s military action in Chechnya. 
The bombing of apartment buildings in Moscow and other Russian cities in summer 2000 is once 
more propagated as a terrorist attack from the Caucasus, even if any kind of official proof is still 
missing. The intervention in Chechnya is portrayed as fighting against terrorism, and the West 
should support it instead of constantly criticising Moscow. Other analysts assess the close co-
operation between Russia and the West as a tactical policy which will not lead to any new 
medium-term strategic alliances.  
 
Even if Putin’s position is not shared by all members of the Russian elite, he is supported 
by reform oriented representatives. They mostly share the position of a new window of 
opportunity of Russia’s external relations and internal development. Under this assumption, the 
EU is of growing importance for Russia and the events of September 11 have an impact on 
almost all areas of co-operation between Russia and the European Union.  
 
Security partnership 
Since starting to widen its perception of the EU from a purely economic player to a political 
actor, Russia has been interested in security co-operation with the European Union. The 
intention is connected with Russia’s concept of a multilateral world order. In this concept, the 
EU is seen as an alternative to a US-dominated world. Therefore, the Russian government has 
been welcoming the strengthening of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, but did 
not agree with the western security concept that strengthening European security and defence 
co-operation is part of transatlantic co-operation. Even before September 11 the US refused to 
participate directly in the NATO operations in Macedonia. As an indirect consequence of 
September 11, one should assume  decreasing American involvement in European conflicts. 
Therefore Western Europe has a need to establish a new security partnership with Russia to 
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cooperate in preventing and fighting regional conflicts in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the 
western part of the CIS. 
 
Putin-oriented statements and official action after September 11 suggest that Russia is no 
longer interested in a multilateral world order, but is part of the international anti-terrorist 
operation. Once more Putin’s speech in the German Bundestag can be mentioned as a signal for 
overcoming the legacies of the Cold War and proclaiming Russia an ally of the West. This also 
includes close co-operation or even membership in western organizations, not excluding NATO. 
In addition to NATO issues, Russian positions are also focusing on strengthening the European 
Security and Defence Policy, as well as increasing security co-operation between Russia and the 
EU. The new goals of security co-operation were part of the EU-Russia summit in Brussels in 
October 2001. The output fixed in a ”Joint declaration on stepping up dialogue and co-operation 
on political and security matters” opens opportunities for Russian participation in civilian and 
military crisis management operations of the European Union Defence and Security Policy. 
Furthermore a statement on mutual co-operation to combat international terrorism in 
compliance with the international law and the UN Charter was signed. Russia’s requirement to 
strengthen the ESDP should be considered as an opportunity for deepening EU integration.  
 
Partnership of modernization  
If Russia keeps the door open to being a western country, it has the opportunity to transform 
itself from a historically great power to a prosperous European nation. This transformation 
would decide a fundamental Russian debate about self-definition between being a superpower 
on the one hand or being a successful modern state on the other. If the reaction to September 11 
leads to the latter approach, Russia’s future development will further co-operation with Europe.  
 
The European Union and its member states fulfil several conditions for a modernisation 
partnership. The EU is customer number one for Russian exports, and with about 40 percent 
amount of foreign direct investment, the EU member states are the biggest direct investors in 
Russia. The Union is also the largest provider of technical assistance to Russia. Furthermore, 
supporting the Central and East European candidates states through the combination of 
impending membership and rule-setting for internal development from the outside is a unique 
success story for stabilising transition processes. If Russia is setting new goals for its transition, 
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the Union should use these experiences to stabilise internal Russian developments. Potentially, 
the EU policies of the technical assistance program TACIS and the humanitarian aid office 
ECHO can be adopted to the additional requirements. The recently adopted EU Country 
Strategy Paper 2000-2006 and National Indicative Programme 2002-2003 for the Russian 
Federation include some important areas of further technical assistance for Russia. By 
identifying areas of co-operation such as administrative reform, civil society development, 
deregulation, corporate governance and social reform, the approach goes far beyond the 
Washington Consensus based on supporting liberalisation and privatisation at the beginning of 
the 1990s. In evaluating the capacity of the EU’s technical assistance to Russia, one should also 
take into consideration the comparatively low amount of resources budgeted. Since 1991, when 
the EU set priorities in its external relations and its function as a soft security provider, the 
Union has provided € 6.2 billion in technical assistance to the Balkans and only € 1.5 billion to 
Russia.  
 
Economic partnership  
The events of September 11 are also a new impulse for economic co-operation between Russia 
and the EU. This very area was the beginning of Russia’s co-operation with the EU. The Union is 
the most important trade partner for Russia, and the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement 
signed in July 1994 already contained the option of a European free trade area. The trade 
relations between Russia and the European Union are dominated by Russian energy exports. On 
the one hand this trade structure is of mutual interest, but on the other hand strengthening the 
energy-based economy allows Russia to postpone further modernisation.  
 
September 11 has an additional impact on Russian-European economic relations. At the 
Brussels summit in October 2001 Russia and the European Union declared the creation of a 
Common European Economic area. The guidelines are restricted to the idea of bringing EU and 
Russia closer together, to removing obstacles to trade, investment and transit and to paving the 
way for negotiations on Russian WTO accession. A clear concept of designing a common 
European economic area is still missing, but nevertheless extending security related co-
operation towards a widespread partnership might be a fresh impulse. Taking into 
consideration requirements of Russian modernisation, the economic relationship should go 
beyond energy exports  from Russia to Europe.  
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From tactical cooperation to sustainable partnership 
In order to define the impact of September 11 on EU-Russian relations one should consider three 
aspects. First of all, the internal Russian discussion has been dominated by US and NATO 
related issues; second, the discussion is not finished; and finally, Putin in his clearly post-Cold 
War styled policy is not being supported by all Russian decision makers and analysts.  
 
The crucial question remains to what extent the consequences of September 11 will go 
further than single-issue short-term action toward impulses to strengthen integration and co-
operation between East and West. Taking into account all the threats and challenges to Russia’s 
current position, the most important task is to transform tactical co-operation in sustainable 
partnerships between Russia, Europe and the United States. These partnerships have to be based 
on a large number of actors and cannot be limited to security-related issues. At this very point 
the problem of belonging to different kinds of societies plays a significant factor, and the alliance 
can by no means be limited to common security interests. While Western societies are 
consolidated democracies, market economies and pluralistic civil societies, Russia is still under 
transition from authoritarian rule toward Western modernisation and pluralism.  
 
The current situation can be best described as a window of opportunity. If Russia 
continues its policy of becoming a modern European country, the EU is challenged to take on a 
growing function. In the fields of modernisation and economic co-operation, the EU is already a 
strong actor – its role as a security and defence provider still has to be improved. While 
September 11 has already had some considerable consequences for relations between Russia and 
the West, even after six months it is still too early to assess the lasting impact on EU-Russia 
relations. Future developments depend on Russia’s strategic choice for further modernisation 
and the EU’s capacity and capability of being a security and defence actor in the international 
arena. 
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United States – The transatlantic dimension 
 
The deep impact the events of September 11 have left on the United States and on the American 
view of the world is shaping transatlantic relations. Those partners and institutions that are of 
relevance or of support in the current challenges will be at the center of US perception of this 
relationship. Those who remain indifferent or become cause for concern will move to the 
margins of the relationship – to say the least. 
 
This watershed of perceptions does not even exclude institutions such as NATO, the 
cornerstone of American engagement in Europe. For years, ”going global” had been the 
catchword for the changes ahead, much supported and called for by US policy makers. When a 
situation arose which – by definition – transcended the territorial principle, and when NATO's 
members for the first time invoked Article 5 of the treaty, NATO became marginalized. The 
autonomy of American military action turned out to be more relevant than the inclusion of the 
alliance as an actor. Likewise, the changing nature of transatlantic relations affects Europe and 
the European members of NATO. The European efforts to introduce synergy to crisis 
management and rapid reaction were proven irrelevant by the consequences of September 11. If 
NATO was not the appropriate place for preparing and implementing the US response, then the 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) seemed to be unattractive to the EU's principal 
actors.  
 
Both the US and the Europeans enter into a new phase of their relationship guided by 
conclusions from recent experience, which will most likely be of formative significance but may 
at the same time not reflect appropriately the longer-term interests of the powers involved. This 
applies to the instrumental approach of the US to multilateralism and its institutions as much as 
for the Europeans and their lukewarm approach to ESDP.  
 
Issues of transatlantic engagement 
A new transatlantic agenda addressing the issues of the 21st Century is needed with long-term 
commitments from both sides of the Atlantic and a strong political will to implement this 
agenda. September 11 has put the notion of an Atlantic Community back on the radar screens of 
Western politics. Besides the sobering perceptions referred to above, the challenges ahead 
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inspire reflections on an agenda of cooperation and joint action. When acting together, the US 
and Europe need deeper relations than exist today. Windows of opportunity could be found in 
many issues, as the following list may show:  
§ Greater transparency, closer cooperation, and the sharing of intelligence are prerequisites 
in the fight against organized crime, trafficking, and the identification of terrorist 
activities at an early stage; 
§ A conclusive security strategy, including anti-proliferation strategies and counter-terror 
policies towards third countries;  
§ Adequate burden sharing focusing on output-goals rather than on input figures such as 
defense spending; 
§ Effective means of cooperation between ESDP and NATO - in the light of current events, 
the former US conditionality of ”no duplication, no discrimination, no decoupling” 
seems rather outdated; 
§ Ongoing common support for the stabilization of South Central Europe; 
§ Re-engagement in the Middle East Peace Process; 
§ A common strategic approach to the second round of NATO enlargement.  
 
With these issues in mind, the potential of ”positive engagement” across the Atlantic comes to 
light. In many ways, the current war against terror replicates the method of negative community 
building – negative in the sense of defining one's commonness as a function of an outside threat. 
Fundamentalist Islamic terrorism seems unlikely to dominate the Western agenda for longer 
than a phase. There is no political ideology capable of challenging the model of pluralist 
democracy on a worldwide scale. The fundamentalist trends in the Islamic world, the ethno-
ideologies and the movements led by charismatic figures appear antagonistic in character but 
are mostly focused on the respective home audiences. They do not have the power to pose a 
military threat to the West but could disrupt the increasingly interdependent economic 
processes.  
 
In terms of its regulatory policy, the West is presented with the opportunity to shape 
developments in an active manner and to go further than merely reacting to prevent danger. 
This opportunity brings with it both challenges and risks since it requires a well-functioning 
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pluralist form of democracy that is not dependent on external pressure to take action, to 
mobilize resources and to enter into alliances.  
 
Interdependent unilateralism? 
Western civilization constitutes the foundation on which the unprecedented globalization of 
production and trade, financial markets and services is based. The physical dimensions of this 
interdependence have now outgrown its socio-cultural origins, but the political mechanisms of 
control and regulation in Western societies have failed to develop at the same pace. A colorful 
set of protest movements reminds policy makers on every major summit that an adequate level 
of action for the safeguarding and further development of social goods does not yet exist. More 
than other spheres of world politics, the Western states are committed to international 
cooperation and supranational integration, yet the social foundation and social acceptance of 
this policy are not proceeding at the same pace. This is what causes policy makers to respond to 
the globalization of challenges with regional integration. Yet the steps taken still require 
legitimization at national level. Problem solving, decision-making and legitimization must all be 
brought together at one level. At the same time, the need to assert oneself in a world that is 
growing ever smaller places pressure on the West to modernize itself.  
 
The regulatory blueprints in Europe and America are in competition with one another 
and with alternatives in other regions of the world. This rivalry could be converted into an 
opportunity for mutual learning. Instead, the patterns of reaction seem to diverge rather than to 
converge: While the issues of global economic integration are addressed through a variety of 
multilateral forums, challenges to the security of Western societies prompt national responses. 
Bridging this gap requires a more intensive transatlantic dialogue: Europe and America share a 
deeper interdependence than is suggested by the current patterns of their asymmetric 
relationship.  
 
Burden sharing and power sharing  
America must mean more to Europe than simply compensating for European shortcomings, 
representation of interests or security. The will and the means to assert oneself are the 
preconditions for the creation of a community with a positive rationale. In order to realize and 
to secure their objectives, the Europeans require a partnership with the Americans: 
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§ Creating a new European order in accordance with the rules of European integration 
needs the support of the United States. Hesitance and ambiguities on the American side 
undercut the difficult process of joint European commitments towards a meaningful 
European security and defense capability. 
§ Developing and protecting the standards needed for pluralistic democracy and for 
market economics during the process of transformation in East Central Europe means 
more than just adhering to the community acquis. Europe requires the attention and the 
normative power of American foreign policy. 
§ After the shock of September 11, Europe is more vulnerable and more exposed than the 
United States. Players and conflict situations of crucial importance for the future of the 
international system are close at hand.  
 
Without the transatlantic partnership the danger is that stagnation will set in and that the 
process of European unity will falter when faced with what are inevitable burdens and risks. 
European politics need America's confidence in order to realize their most ambitious objectives. 
On the other hand, Europe is not simply a beneficiary of US engagement. Its significance to the 
United States of America cannot lie in seconding American superpower politics. The sharing of 
burdens and responsibility and a partnership between equals is the prerequisite for the 
transatlantic community in the future. The USA, as the truly global power, needs Europe, as an 
emerging power, which despite its cultural, historical and political diversity is capable of 
representing its interests and making best use of its combined resources. 
 
In terms of world politics, American power politics need to share the burden with such a 
Europe. It will not be possible to stabilize Russia without a European contribution to 
cooperation and integration. A similar assumption will develop with regard to China.  
Confronting the new threats by terrorist action from within the West will require intensive 
cooperation, including advancements along the lines of integration. 
§ America needs the resources of the European economic power in order to flank its peace 
and security order – not just in the Middle East and in Africa but also in trouble spots in 
Asia and Latin America. To this end, Europe must be more strongly involved in 
negotiations on political settlements.  
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§ Developing solutions to global challenges – be it the environment, migration or social 
and ethnic conflicts – is not about preserving the power of security policy. Anyone who 
wants to make a real contribution requires partners and coalitions. Together, Europe and 
the United States represent the ideal critical mass. 
§ Should the transatlantic partnership weaken, rivals of the West could play America and 
Europe off against one another, manipulating global competition between economic 
blocs. At a time when East Asia is unfolding its economic and demographic potential, 
such transatlantic rivalry would be damaging to both partners.  
 
A new order in international politics, standards in peacefulness and the balancing out of 
interests and a conflict prevention strategy do not arise from coalitions convened on an ad-hoc 
basis. These goals are pursued and upheld in a credible manner by visible communities of allies. 
Otherwise, they can be revoked by calculated acts of aggression at any time. Europe and 
America are the only two remaining reliable guarantors of stability in the world. Consequently, 
their willingness to resolve situations and their capability of achieving results are being put to 
the test on a daily basis, even in regions and areas where the existing organs of transatlantic 
cooperation have no jurisdiction.  
 
Many of the existing problem-solving approaches can still only be put into practice if the 
burden is shared. A high level of political liaison and the appropriate close network of 
communication structures are necessary – the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990 with its loose 
mechanisms for consultation has failed to deliver the strategic link across the Atlantic. With the 
establishment of the position of the High Representative, the phone number that Henry 
Kissinger was missing has eventually been assigned but no effective pooling of the political 
power of Europe has taken place. The new troika system does not yet dispose of the same clout 
as the continuing patterns of diplomacy shown by the large European states. As long as their 
ambitions and resources do not find adequate roles in providing external leadership to the EU, 
an Atlantic Political Community can hardly emerge.  
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NATO a defunct military alliance 
Afghanistan and the war against terror once again reaffirm that, as a purely military alliance, 
NATO has no future. In addition, the contractual foundation of this political alliance lacks any 
clear definition of its future content. NATO's plausibility lies in its role as an "alliance of 
democracies" bringing together Europe and North America and open to all the democracies of 
the European continent. No European state which is admitted to the EU could be refused access 
to NATO if it wants to become a member. Should this link be broken, the compatibility of 
Western institution building would be lost. Without the development of a visible defense 
capability, the Europeans will not succeed in convincing the United States that they are 
extending their commitments within the Alliance.  
 
The European Union, in particular the larger Member States, must find the willingness 
and the ability to protect their Western interests and to act jointly with the United States outside 
Europe. This requires a more sophisticated security concept and may need a reversal of 
approaches: So far, crisis management and rapid reaction in Europe are considered a joint or 
common task while territorial defense remains a national privilege. With a view to the current 
difficulties with ESDP on the one hand, and in light of the many duplications in the field of 
ground defense forces on the other hand, much could be gained if at least a number of European 
states built a common territorial defense structure.  
 
Nowhere is the degree of transatlantic interdependence and the potential of future 
cooperation more visible than in economic relations. Economically, Europe and the USA are the 
two most closely bound regions in the world. The potential of transatlantic economic relations is 
such that, also bearing in mind the challenges from the Far East, there is a need for new 
regulatory mechanisms. Given the unprecedented level of economic interdependence and a 
consensus on economic power, regulatory policy and understanding of market economics, the 
development of a common transatlantic market is long overdue.  
 
Already, a large proportion of bilateral trade takes place free of any restrictions, but 
major exceptions remain, e.g. non-tariff trade barriers. This is why Americans and Europeans 
should agree on a continuous liberalization initiative designed to accelerate the implementation 
of WTO rulings, to create a joint basis for the consequences of open markets, to prepare the 
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development of international standards and to agree on the essentials of their economic 
regulatory policy. Such an approach could be an interim stage on the road to a transatlantic 
single market guaranteeing the free movement of goods, capital, services and persons.  
 
The combination of perspectives in the fields of economy, society and security as 
sketched out briefly in the above, demonstrates the peculiar nature of the link between Europe 
and the United States, even when and while choosing to act independently of each other. 
Friedrich Schiller's William Tell, in one of his famous lines, states that the strong one is most 
powerful alone … a profound misunderstanding as it turns out – and not to be repeated in the 
transatlantic relationship of the future. 
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INTERNAL DIMENSION 
 
Foreign and security policy: more than CFSP/ESDP 
While EU activities were developed in reaction to September 11, questions arose concerning the 
development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): Is it necessary to re-assess the concept of the CFSP/ESDP? 
Several aspects need considering: 
§ First of all, a general scepticism regarding the EU’s foreign and security political 
capabilities. Examples pointing at a lack of capabilities are numerous and can be found 
on the level of the EU member states, on the supranational level with respect to the role 
of the institutions involved, on the side of third countries, in media comments as well as 
in the academic debate.  
§ Second, the EU’s role as a crisis manager in the Afghanistan conflict raised doubts about 
the coherence and strength of European foreign policy. For example, at the same time 
that the EU Troika was on a diplomatic mission in Islamic countries, the British foreign 
minister undertook his own initiatives. In the past, such a parallelism of European 
diplomacy was often criticised due to its weakening effects on the perception of the EU 
as a coherent foreign policy actor. This time, the argument runs in favour of parallel 
initiatives, i.e. additional activities by one or more member states are perceived as 
strengthening European foreign policy – based on the assumption, of course, that a 
common interest is expressed. 
§ Third, a further reason for scepticism is related to the results of the Capabilities 
Improvement Conference of November 2001. If there ever was a certain euphoria 
concerning the military capabilities that should be made available by EU and non-EU 
states to achieve the headline goal, the results of the Capability Improvement Conference 
speak in favour of a more sober analysis. There is need for stronger efforts concerning 
military forces, e.g. protection of forces deployed, commitment capability and logistics, 
and concerning strategic capabilities, e.g. command, control, communications and 
intelligence resources (C3I). To remedy these shortcomings, the member states agreed on 
a European Capability Action Plan; nonetheless, one should not expect the existing 
problems to be satisfactorily solved in a short period of time. The controversial debate 
within and amongst EU member states on the purchase of the A400M military transport 
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aircraft indicated, as one example, that the EU still has a long way to go before being 
capable of handling military operations embracing all levels of the Petersberg tasks. 
 
The Spanish EU presidency was confronted with a comprehensive mandate to further develop 
CFSP/ESDP. But to find the necessary agreement between the interests involved demands time. 
In order to avoid frustration, it will be important to accept a longer-term perspective. Could EU 
forces be able to carry out full Kosovo-type operations without recourse to US assets by 2015? 
Would it be possible, in a period from 2015-2030, to achieve a progressive transfer of national 
decision-making, command and control competencies into a common structure, in which 
qualified majority voting in some form would be the rule within a common legal framework? 
 
Apart from accepting the above mentioned time dimension, the EU has realised that 
security policy will have to follow a comprehensive concept – September 11 has underlined that. 
A look at the non-military capabilities of EU external relations offers a broad range of 
instruments and policies available. However, what is still lacking is a strategic vision of the EU’s 
foreign policy. Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union defines the objectives of CFSP 
without reflecting a clear geopolitical thinking. Because of the high degree of global 
interdependence the EU is facing as a leading economic and trade political power, and in 
accordance with the objectives laid down in Article 11 TEU, the political, economic and societal 
stability of regions, no matter how near or far, is an essential interest of the EU.  Therefore, the 
geographic extension of CFSP/ESDP needs to be clarified, which means to define whether the 
significance of this policy will be mainly concentrated on the enlarged EU’s closer 
neighbourhood or whether it is a policy with a global outreach. This implies asking whether it 
seems possible to think of Petersberg tasks when talking about distant regions, as for example 
Asia. 
 
CFSP/ESDP cannot be sufficiently developed without finding a satisfactory solution for 
how to improve the decision-making process. By offering a flexible instrument for 
accommodating the interests of pro-integrationist member states, enhanced co-operation can 
diminish the negative effects of possible blockages of classical decision-making procedures in an 
enlarged EU. Furthermore, effective decision-making and common external action may be 
increasingly difficult to achieve without moves towards at least the partial communitarization of 
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CFSP. Additionally, in an attempt to overcome the outmoded pillar structure and in the light of 
the growing need to link internal and external policy tools, pressure toward moving the field of 
foreign and security policies closer to the Community method will increase.  
 
Attempts to further communitarize CFSP must exclude the sensitive field of military 
affairs, to which the current and future member states attribute the high value of national 
sovereignty. Military crisis management as one branch of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy 
must not be linked with the term ‘communitarization’. Instead, matters of joint concern in the 
military sphere of ESDP should – for the time being – continue to be handled by means of 
intergovernmentalism. On the other hand, the traditional civilian aspects of the EU’s foreign 
policy, including non-military crisis management should be brought closer to the Community 
method as the resources necessary to implement them are to be found mainly in the area of 
today’s Community competences. In this respect, the role of the European Commission with 
regard to non-military elements of CFSP should be reinforced. That the Commission has 
pledged itself to non-military crisis management seems reasonable and in accordance with the 
logic of EU external relations. But if the coherence of military and non-military measures should 
be ensured and the non-military capabilities and capacities put comprehensively to use, the 
Commission must be granted an even stronger role. 
 
The competences of the Commissioner responsible for external relations would have to 
be increased accordingly and co-operation between his office and the office of the High 
Representative for the CFSP would have to be linked more closely in order to create synergy 
effects and to counteract an emerging institutional competition. In the search for a face and voice 
for EU foreign policy it will prove imperative that third states can recognise a continuously 
present and active representative who is able to rely on the support of the member states. 
 
The question of legitimacy is of central importance for promoting acceptance of the CFSP 
among EU citizens. In addition to the primary role accorded to national parliaments, it is 
therefore necessary to involve the European Parliament in all non-military aspects, thus 
providing for a double legitimation. Its participation should be guaranteed not only by the EP’s 
right for its view to be taken into consideration and its right to be regularly informed, but it 
ultimately requires the EP’s parliamentary assent. 
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In an effort to further strengthen the efficiency of the EU’s foreign and security policy 
dimension it is worth striving in a mid-term perspective for more qualified majority voting in 
the Council concerning the non-military aspects of CFSP/ESDP. The right of initiative would 
have to remain with the member states. However, it should also be bestowed upon the High 
Representative and the Commission. 
 
Institutional developments alone will not suffice to enhance the EU’s role as a holistic 
international security actor. The Union will need to further develop its operational assets and 
capabilities. It is in this respect that the current and future member states of the EU will have to 
further intensify their efforts, streamline their overall military structures and increase both their 
national defence budgets and developmental aid spending if they want to live up to their own 
expectations. 
 
To sum up, enhanced cooperation in its present form needs to be transformed into a 
concept that will lead to a far-reaching communitarization of CFSP for two motives: 
§ to strengthen and extend the foreign, security and (ultimately) defence political 
capabilities of the EU; 
§ to avoid that ad hoc coalition building, which does not respect the agreed 
institutional and legal framework of the EU, becomes the typical pattern for crisis 
management. 
 
Comprehensive security includes justice and home affairs 
Security in a comprehensive understanding implies, furthermore, that CFSP/ESDP cannot be 
limited to one pillar of the European treaty framework. On the contrary, there is a necessity for 
an overarching approach – which was further underlined following September 11 when Justice 
and Home Affairs became a central topic in the security debate. To close the gap between 
“common” and “intergovernmental” would thus imply the harmonisation of conflicting policy 
fields for a common interest. This will also touch those policy fields still located in the third 
pillar.  
 
 The aspect of Justice and home affairs will become an even more important part of 
European foreign and security policy post September 11. Specific measures have been agreed on 
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in response to the challenge of terrorism. In general the EU intends to create an area of freedom, 
security and justice by 2004. The consequences of this are equally far-reaching as in the case of 
the Common Market. Common guidelines in asylum, visa and migration policies and the 
establishment of Europol and Eurojust would be sufficient to reach a new step in the process of 
integration. Additional projects like the establishment of a European force for border controls, a 
further development of Eurojust into a public prosecutors’ office with specific rights to 
investigate in member states and the extension of the operative rights of Europol are already 
evolving and they all fit into the logic of a common area of interior security.  
 
Similar to the case of CFSP, the distinct pillar containing the remaining aspects of cooperation 
of police and justice will in the end have to be abolished subsequently. However, if the EU is 
about to tackle the trans-border consequences of the freedom of movement in the common 
market, a full legislative participation of the European Parliament and a democratic scrutiny of 
executive actions should be guaranteed. It is here that the charter of basic rights will have to 
play a decisive role. It should protect citizens from interferences by common institutions in their 
rights. The European Court of Justice should guarantee the legal security required. As this field 
affects citizens directly, special attention should be paid to the separation of duties between 
member states and the EU. The fight against terrorism must not weaken our basic values and 
rights. Thus, the democratic and understandable realization of an area of freedom, security and 
justice will be one task for the convention and the 2004 intergovernmental conference. 
 
 
Enlargement 
The implications of the terrorist attacks of September 11 on EU enlargement need to be analysed 
with regard to two particular sets of questions: 
§ How might the fight against international terrorism affect the timing of a next round of 
EU widening? 
§ How will changes to the Union's acquis especially in the field of Justice and Home Affairs 
affect the conditions under which new members join the EU? 
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Effects on the timing 
As an immediate reaction to the events of September 11 the European Commission and 
representatives of the candidate countries stressed the importance of EU enlargement for the 
sake of security and stability on the continent. The enlargement process and especially the 
timing of a next round of EU widening should not be negatively affected. The necessity to 
adequately react to the challenges of international terrorism should not hamper developments of 
major European projects such as enlargement. On the contrary, the process should rather gain 
momentum than come to a halt. 
 
 On the other hand, the impact of the terrorist attacks had the potential to slow down 
enlargement. Considerations were expressed that enlargement efforts might move far down the 
list of immediate priorities for EU-15 governments. Moreover, worldwide economic recession 
following September 11 might have the potential to negatively influence public opinion towards 
major European projects, not at least towards enlargement – especially since during crisis 
situations people seem more cautious about large projects. Economic recession might even 
burden EU accession talks, which were about to enter their final phase. Moreover, due to the 
undeniable correlation between EU reform and enlargement, a potential slow-down of the so-
called post-Nice reform process could have negatively affected EU widening. 
 
In spite of the above considerations, September 11 and its aftermath did not negatively 
affect the enlargement process. On the contrary, the process did not lose but rather gained 
momentum. The vast majority of accession countries were able to provisionally close a number 
of negotiation chapters. The Belgian Presidency in the second half of 2001, although very 
preoccupied with coordinating the EU's anti-terrorist reactions, was able to fulfill the objectives 
laid down in the Commission's roadmap, which had been adopted by the Nice European 
Council in December 2000. Moreover, the Heads of State and Government have reaffirmed their 
determination to conclude negotiations with a first number of candidate countries by the end of 
2002, so that those states can participate in the elections to the European Parliament in 2004 as 
members. Acknowledging the progress made in the negotiations and agreeing with the 2001 
Progress Report of the Commission, the Laeken European Council identified ten countries able 
to conclude negotiations by the end of 2002. Although a number of unsettled problems still 
remain (e.g. negotiations on the chapters concerning agriculture and structural policy; the 
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Cyprus question), the likelihood of a “big bang” enlargement by 2004/2005 including up to 10 
new member states has increased. At the same time, the state of preparation of the candidates 
and the modalities and the complexity of the accession negotiations did not and do not allow an 
earlier entry of new member states – as some had pledged in favour of after September 11. 
 
One cannot yet assess the impact of the fight against international terrorism on 
subsequent second or third rounds of enlargement. However, as the details of a next round of 
EU widening will become evident at the end of 2002 or early 2003, there will be a need to agree 
on a coherent and binding enlargement strategy. If the Union does not want to risk losing its 
capacity as an anchor of democratic stability and economic reform in those countries which will 
have not entered the Union in a next round of enlargement, it must bring those countries closer 
to its policies and stipulate definite dates of accession in the framework of a post-enlargement-
enlargement strategy. 
 
Effects of an evolving acquis 
In an effort to fight international terrorism, the EU has tabled a series of proposals and adopted 
a number of actions, especially in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. The agreements reached 
will affect the conditions under which new members join the EU, since demands on accession 
countries will increase. The adoption of a quickly developing acquis on internal security 
constitutes a major challenge for the candidates' already stretched police and judicial systems. 
The accession countries will have to strengthen their border-control efforts, share intelligence 
and information and increase their state capacity to track the movement of persons. The EU will 
have to help in developing institutional capacities and prove practical assistance, both human 
and financial. 
 
The fight against international terrorism requires to improve coherence and co-
ordination between the EU's external and internal security concerns. To achieve this, the Union 
should take into account the neighbourhood aspects of existing border regimes, visa and 
immigration policies when designing, implementing and revising common strategies on its 
direct neighbourhood in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Proposals on legislation in the area 
of Justice and Home Affairs should contain a “neighbourhood impact assessment” that 
considers the specific exposure of the accession countries and/or future new member states. 
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In an attempt to strengthen border controls on the enlarged EU's new eastern borders, 
thought should be given to the idea to establish a “European Border Guard”, consisting of 
border guards from all member states who are specially trained to serve in joint missions. 
Countries with an external border would transfer their control duties to the European Border 
Guard and share the burdens of border policing with all member states. Countries without an 
external border could contribute to the costs of border policing directly and/or via the EU 
budget and get access to sensitive information through their national officials serving in such a 
border guard. Such a European Border Guard needs to be based on the principles of equal 
partnership and reciprocity among new and old member states. 
 
Finally, with the fusion of the Single Market and the Schengen zone, there is a rationale 
to create a European Customs Service composed of customs officers from all member states. 
Through a joint institution, member states could share the financial burdens (and revenues), 
exercise a joint control and thus develop mutual confidence. 
 
 
European integration beyond September 11 – impetus or blockade for the  
EU reform process? 
 
There were two rival theses after the terrorist attacks of September 11: Some thought that the EU 
might be forced to press faster and more urgently for integration in order to address the 
challenges of international terrorism. Others, however, expected the process of integration to 
slow down or even that the community method would step back behind intergovernmental 
processes of coordination. 
 
At first, both processes could be observed: At the summit of Gent in October 2001 as well 
as at a dramatic dinner at 10 Downing Street, which was planned for a small group of leaders, a 
more intensified process of coordination among the ”big three” – Germany, UK, France – in the 
fight against terrorism seemed to be established. There have already been complaints about the 
development of a political directoire of the big member states. Yet, parallel to this and within the 
shortest of time 80 measures to fight terrorism have been adopted within the EU framework.  
 
 The EU has taken action in various policy fields and has shown considerable 
engagement to adapt itself to the new conditions of international politics after September 11. 
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However, in many cases – for example the tightening of the directive against money laundering 
or the proposals for a European arrest warrant – these measures have been discussed on the 
European level for a long time, but could not be realized. In these cases September 11 had a 
catalytic effect to overcome worries by single member states. The measures named above, 
however, have only been a start. On top of that, the EU intends to develop interior security as 
part of a wider definition of security. 
 
The EU reform process 
A second important area of the internal development of the EU which might be affected by the 
events relating to September 11 is the process of reforming the institutions and decision-making 
processes of the EU. This process goes back to an assignment by the summit of Nice in 
December 2000. The EU should be enabled to tackle future challenges by being providing with 
an understandable division of tasks, a democratic division of power and a simplified body of 
treaties. The Belgian presidency of the Council intended to pave the way for the coming process 
of reform at the Laeken summit on 14 and 15 December 2001. This agenda, however, has been 
changed in a dramatic manner. The fight against international terrorism was given first priority 
after the attacks of September 11. Belgium, nevertheless, managed to bring the internal reforms 
of the EU back into focus again. On the basis of proposals made by a small but prominent 
advisory group, the Belgian premier Verhofstadt presented a paper with about 60 questions on 
the future of Europe to the other European capitals. Backed by Germany and France, who had 
explicitly expressed their support for a European constitution at their meeting in Nantes on 
November 23, the draft was approved by all member states. 
 
The 60 questions posed in the Laeken Declaration of the European Council hide an 
agenda which, given the quarrels at the Nice summit, the various problems of European policy 
making, and diverging national interests on the future of Europe, can almost be called 
presumptuous. For the EU intends nothing less than a general revision of its competencies, 
institutions and treaties: 
§ The distribution and delimitation of competencies between the Member States and the 
EU are to be reorganized. This may mean intensified integration, in particular in issues of 
internal and external security, as well as the re-delegation of tasks to the national level. 
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§ In order to achieve more democracy, transparency and efficiency, the interrelationship 
among the Union's institutions is to be examined. For that purpose, the currently existing 
decision-making patterns will be basically reviewed. As a consequence, the direct 
election of the President of the Commission, a stronger role of the national parliaments, 
and the abolition of the Presidency´s six-months term of office will have to be discussed. 
§ While heading for a Constitution, the present Treaties are to be simplified. Core 
questions deal with the future legal status of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the 
simplification and reorganization of the Treaties as well as with putting an end to the 
differentiation between “Community” and “Union”. 
 
A successful implementation of this stage of the reform process will result in the establishment 
of a Political Union as it was aimed at as early as eleven years ago with the 1991 Maastricht 
Treaty. Yet the single market and economic union were neither then nor with the 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty or the 2000 Nice Treaty complemented by corresponding political structures. 
Once again the chance to achieve Political Union is now offered by the work of the Convention. 
These plans for reform, therefore, refer to long-term projects. The effect of September 11 in the 
areas in question can only be to exert additional pressure to take action and to provide just one 
more argument for the necessity of efficient and democratically legitimated decision-making 
procedures. The basic need for reform for an enlarging Union that wants to be a globally 
relevant player had already been a matter of urgency before September 11. 
 
Conclusion 
After decades of focusing on economic objectives, the EU, today, is more and more measured by 
its performance in basic duties of the state such as the guarantee of interior and exterior security, 
the realization of personal freedom, general prosperity and appropriate social conditions. The 
fact that these challenges had already been tackled before September 11 illustrates the 
magnitude of the ambitious integration projects initiated by the member states and the common 
institutions over the past few years: 
§ introduction of Euro notes and coins in January 2002; 
§ start of the Lisbon-Process in March 2000 to develop a modern knowledge-based society, 
which is intended to make the common market the most competitive and dynamic 
economic area in the world; 
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§ conclusion of the first enlargement negotiations by the end of 2002, followed by the entry 
of new member states; 
§ decision to build up a military and civilian capacity to react on crises by 2003; 
§ development of an area of freedom, security and law by 2004; 
§ continuation of the debate on the future of Europe, which had begun before the Nice 
summit, and conclusion of the reform of the EU system by 2004. 
 
All these projects will change the face of Europe lastingly and fundamentally. For the European 
Union they imply even more political responsibility and they strengthen the claims for working 
decision-making procedures. September 11 meant an additional impetus for integration that will 
influence the reform of the political system of the EU. 
